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1.

RESOURCES OF THE CONTINENTAL SHELF

A very observable phenomenon of the evolution of both
national and international law with respect to the sea is that its
occurrence has had a direct, and perhaps necessary, correlation
with the development of technology permitting a use and the need
for that use. Before looking at regulatory aspects of offshore oil
production it would, therefore, be helpful to look briefly at the need
for offshore oil as evidenced by its development and the foreseeable
limits of this development. There are today approximately 30
nations which have established offshore oil and gas production with
aggregate reserves of approximately 85 billion barrels or 20 percent
of the world's total reserve figures. On a worldwide basis, current
offshore production is about 6.5 million barrels per day or 16
percent of the world's total.' The Department of the Interior has
estimated that by 1980 approximately 30 percent of the oil
requirements and 40 percent of gas requirements from this country
will come from our offshore
Looking at the United States alone, its outer continental shelf
is at least 850,000 square miles (from established state limits to a
depth of 200 meters) and may be as large as 1,329,000 square miles
(between established state limits and a depth of 2500 meters).
Compared with the area of the uplands contained in the United
States and its territories of 3,615,000 square miles, its outer
continental shelf is 23 percent and 36 percent as large, depending
upon which measurement is used? The presently proven reserves of
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oil and gas on the outer continental shelf are 4.3 billion barrels of
oil and 34.2 trillion cubic feet of gas with prospective reserves of an
additional 3 to 19 billion barrels of oil and 27 to 97 trillion cubic
feet of gas. Sulphur reserves are believed to be approximately 37
million tons.4 These figures do not include reserves for state
offshore lands which have to date produced something in excess of
700 million barrels of oil and in areas, such as Prudhoe Bay, have
immense reserves
With due regard to the steadily growing demand for
petroleum, it is likely that these sources will have to be further
developed. If they are not, the resources on some other nation's
offshore will have to be developed. The offshore is where a large
part of today's and most of tomorrow's oil is.
II.

INTERNATIONAL REGULATION

The requisite technology for offshore drilling has been
developed only since the early 1940's and to date the law which has
consequently evolved has related primarily to resource exploration
and exploitation. It is only in very recent years that sufficient
offshore development on the continental shelf has taken place for
the negative aspects of it, such as oil spillage and spatial
interference with other uses, to become material and apparent.
Thus in the 1945 Truman Proclamation' in which the "natural
resources of the subsoil and sea bed of the continental shelf...
contiguous to the coasts of the United States" were claimed as
being "subject to its jurisdiction and control" the principal
purpose was to facilitate the development of petroleum resources.7
The Proclamation contained the premises that there was then a
app. 5-A-9 (1968)
[hereinafter cited as NOSSAMAN OCS STUDY]. The study, for which the author was the
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4. PETROLEUM AND SULPHUR, supra note 3, at 51. See also I NOSSAMAN OCS
STUDY § 5.1.
5. Alaska Oil to Shake Up the Industry, 68 OIL & GAS J., Apr. 20, 1970, at 99, in which
North Slope reserves are reported as being 15 to 40 billion barrels of oil and production is
estimated to build to between I and 2.5 million b.p.d. in 1975 and between 2.5 and 4 million
b.p.d. by 1980.
6. Proclamation No. 2667, Sept. 28, 1945,3 C.F.R. (1943-1948 Comp.) 67.
7. Id. at 68.
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"long range world-wide need for new sources of petroleum and
other minerals," that "such resources underlie many parts of the
continental shelf off the coasts of the United States . . .and...
with modern technological progress their utilization is already
practicable or will become so at an early date," and that "these
resources frequently form a seaward extension of a pool or deposit
lying within the territory." 8 It is noteworthy, however, that the
Proclamation also stated that "self-protection compels the coastal
nation to keep close watch over activities off its shores which are of
the nature necessary for utilization of these resources." 9 The
Truman Proclamation is of continuing significance because the
1969 decision of the International Court of Justice in the North Sea
ContinentalShelf Cases10 held that the Proclamation continued to
be the well-spring of the doctrine of the continental shelf which
exists independently of the Convention on the Continental Shelf."
The doctrine enunciated in that decision was one of "sovereign
rights for the purpose of exploring the sea bed and exploiting its
' 12
natural resources.
The 1958 Convention on the Continental Shelf' 3 also had as its
primary purpose the development of natural resources of the seabed
and subsoil of the continental shelf. The basic rights of the coastal
state in the shelf are stated as being "exclusive [and] sovereign...
for the purpose of exploring it and exploiting its natural
resources."' 4 The definition of the continental shelf also evidences
this purpose in stating that it is to a depth of 200 meters or beyond
"to where the depth of the superjacent waters admits of the
exploitation of the natural resources.' 5 The Convention does
8. Id. at 67.
9. Id.
10. [1969] I.C.J.3.
I1.The Court based its decision on the Truman Proclamation, stating:
The Truman Proclamation [is] the starting point of the positive law on the
subject, and the chief doctrine it enunciated, namely that of the coastal State as
having an original, natural, and exclusive (in short a vested) right to the
continental shelf off its shores, came to prevail over all others, being now
reflected in Article 2 of the 1958 Geneva Convention on the Continental Shelf.
Id. at 32-33.
12. Id. at 22-23.
13. Convention on the Continental Shelf, done at Geneva April 29, 1958, [1964] 1
U.S.T. 471, T.!.A.S. No. 5578,499 U.N.T.S. 311.
14. Art. 2, Paras. 1,2.
15. Art. 1.
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recognize that the waters above the shelf remain high seas and
states:
The exploration of the continental shelf and the exploitation of
its natural resources must not result in any unjustifiable
interference with navigation, fishing or the conservation of the
living resources of the sea, nor result in any interference with
fundamental oceanographic or other scientific research carried
out with the intention of open publication."
The Convention also requires that continental shelf installations
and devices necessary for the development of natural resources and
safety zones therefore shall not be established where the same
would interfere with "recognized sea lanes essential to international
navigation' 7 and that within the safety zones the coastal state shall
take "all appropriate measures for the protection of the living
resources of the sea from harmful agents."' 9
The companion 1958 Convention on the High Seas 9 also
provides that: "Every State shall draw up regulations to prevent
pollution of the seas by the discharge of oil from ships or pipelines
or resulting from the exploitation and exploration of the seabed and
its subsoil."0
Lastly, the 1958 Convention on Fishing and Conservation of
the Living Resources of the High Seas,' a further companion
measure, contains the following provision: "All States have the
duty to adopt, or to co-operate with other States in adopting, such
measures for their respective nationals as may be necessary for the
conservation of the living resources of the high seas. 22 The
Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zoneu2 the
remaining of the four 1958 conventions regarding the contiguous
zone, does not add anything of significance to the foregoing.
16. Art. 5, Para. 1.
17. Art. 5, Para. 6.

18. Art. 5, Para.7.
19. Convention on the High Seas, done at Geneva April 29, 1958, [1962] 2 U.S.T. 2312,
T.I.A.S. No. 5200,450 U.N.T.S. 82.
20. Art. 24.
21. Convention on Fishing and Conservation of the Living Resources of the High Seas,
done at Geneva April 29, 1958 [1966] 17 U.S.T. 138, T.I.A.S. No. 5969, 559 U.N.T.S. 285;
U.N. Doc. A/Conf. 13/L, Art. 54 and Add. 1.
22. Art. 1, Para. 2.
23. Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone, done at Geneva April
29, 1958 [1964] 2 U.S.T. 1606, T.I.A.S. No. 5639,516 U.N.T.S. 205.
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Aside from these quite limited provisions there appears to be
no international treaty or agreement providing for the regulation of
water pollution resulting from offshore oil development. Further,
except insofar as these provisions may constitute or evidence
customary international law, there is no customary international

law on the subjectY4 The 1954 Convention for the Prevention of
Pollution of the Sea by Oil2 5 governs only the discharge of oil and

oily substances by ships26 and the scope of its injunctions were not
broadened by the 1969 International Legal Conference on Marine

Pollution Damage convened by the International Maritime
Consultive Organizations.27
The growth of continental shelf claims being made under the

Convention on the Continental Shelf and otherwise and of offshore
oil and mining

activity

has,

however,

led to

a greatly

increased international interest in the uses of the world's
continental shelves and the areas beyond. In 1967 the General
Assembly established an Ad Hoc Committee to Study Peaceful

Uses of the Sea-Bed and Ocean Floor Beyond Limits of National
Jurisdictiones which was transformed into a permanent 42-member

Committee in 1968. Such Committee was given a broad charter
with respect to economic, technical and legal aspects of the seabed

beyond limits of national jurisdiction ("the continental shelf"),
including the duty to "examine proposed measures of co-operation
to be adopted by the international community in order to prevent

the marine pollution which may result from the exploration and
exploitation of the resources of this area.

12 9

At the same time the

General Assembly adopted a resolution encouraging
the adoption by States of appropriate safeguards against the
dangers of pollution and other hazardous and harmful effects
24. The North Sea Continental Shelf Cases, supra note 10, stated that Articles 1 to 3,
which define the continental shelf and the rights of the coastal state therein, "were...
regarded as reflecting, or as chrystalizing, received or at least emergent rules of customary
international law." [1969] I.C.J. 3, 39.
25. International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution of the Sea by Oil, 1954,
opened for signature May 12, 1954, [1961] 3 U.S.T. 2989, T.I .A.S. No. 4900,327 U.N.T.S.
3. The United States became a party and implemented the same by the adoption of the Oil
Pollution Act of 1961, Pub. L. No. 87-167,75 Stat. 402.
26. Art. 2.
27. International Maritime Consultative Organization, Rept. to the Legal Comm. by
Legal Comm. Working Group, l1-3d Sess. (Jan. 10, 1969). See also Sweeney, Oil Pollution
of the Oceans, 37 FORDHAM L. REv. 193 (1968); Healy, The CMI and IMCO Draft
Conventions on Civil Liabilityfor Oil Pollution, 1969 J. MARITIME L. AND COMMERCE 93.
28. A/R ES/2340 (Sess. XXII, Dec. 28, 1967).
29. A/RES/2467A (Sess. XXIII, Dec. 21, 1968).
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that might arise from the exploration and exploitation of the
resources of the seabed and the ocean floor, and the subsoil
thereof, beyond the limits of national jurisdiction3 0
Such resolution also directed that a study be made by the
Secretary-General
with a view to clarifying all aspects of protection of the living
and other resources of the seabed and ocean floor, the
superjacent waters and the adjacent coasts against the
consequences of pollution and other hazardous and harmful
effects arising from various modalities of such exploration and
exploitation?'
The Sea-Bed Committee, which met in New York in March of
1970 has been considering the issues of the extent of limits of
national jurisdiction, development of the seabed resources and the
preservation of environmental quality. In a twelve point program
presented by the United States on March 6, 1970, it was proposed
that the Committee adopt as two of its objectives the following:
8. To assure that exploration and exploitation of seabed
mineral resources will be carried out in a manner that will
protect human life, prevent conflicts between users of the
seabed, safeguard other uses of the ocean environment against
undue interference, avoid irreparable damage to the environment and its resources, and promote the use of sound conservation practices.
9. To provide terms and procedures governing liability for
damage resulting from exploration and exploitation of seabed
minerals so that damage will be adequately repaired or
compensated 2
30. A/RES/2467B (Sess. XXIII, Dec. 21, 1968).
31. Id.

32. U.N. Doc. A/AC. 138/SC. 2/L. 5/Rev. I, Annex D, at 16 (Mar. 20, 1970). The
remaining objectives were:
1. To encourage exploration and exploitation of seabed resources.
2. To assure that all interested States will have access, without
discrimination, to the seabed for the purpose of exploring and exploiting mineral
resources.
3. To encourage scientific research and the dissemination of scientific and
technologic information related to seabed resources.
4. To encourage the development of services, such as aids to navigation,
maps and charts, weather information, and rescue capability.
5. To provide procedures for the assignment of rights to minerals or groups
of minerals in specific areas under terms that protect the integrity of investments
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The same subject was also discussed earlier this year in the broader
context of other forms of pollution of the human environment by

the Preparatory Committee scheduled for Stockholm in 1972.
There have been even more recent and significant
developments. In April of 1970 legislation was introduced to the

Canadian House of Commons that would establish an Arctic
Waters Pollution Control Zone which would extend "seaward from

the nearest Canadian land [above the 60th parallel] a distance of
one hundred nautical miles," to the median line between Canada
and Greenland (which is less than one hundred miles) and to "all

waters adjacent [to the one hundred mile zone], the natural
resources of whose subjacent submarine areas Her Majesty in right

of Canada has the right to dispose of or exploit."34 Within such
zone the discharge of any substance that would degrade the
quality of the waters "to an extent that is detrimental to their use

by man or any animal, fish or plant that is useful to man" is
prohibited except as authorized by regulation

5

Further, within

such zone Canada would assert the right to control all shipping, to
prescribe standards of vessel construction and operation, and to

prohibit free passage if deemed necessary.36 A rule of strict liability
in seabed resource development, that encourage economic efficiency in the
exploration and exploitation of seabed resources, that prevent a race for claims,
and that discourage operators from seeking to hold large areas for purely
speculative purposes.
6. To provide for a reasonable return on risk investment.
7. To provide revenue to benefit international community purposes, taking
special account of the needs of the developing countries, and to meet the
operating expenses of the international body established to administer its
provisions.

10. To provide for the stability of rules, and yet for the flexibility to
introduce modifications over time responsive to new knowledge and new
developments.
11.To provide effective procedures for the settlement of disputes.
12. In the overall, to establish an international regime so plainly viable that
States will in fact ratify the treaties establishing it.
The Soviet Union presented a very similar position and set of objectives to the Seabeds
Committee. U.N. Press Release SB/7, Mar. 5, 1970.
33. U.N. Press Releases HE/I/Rev. 1,Mar. 6, 1970; SG/SM/1220/HE/2, Mar. 9,
1970.
34. Arctic Waters Pollution Prevention Act Bill C-202 Sect. 3(1), (2), U.S. Dep't State
telegram 091535Z, Apr. 1970, Unclas. Ottawa 441. It was passed by the House of Commons
on April 22, 1970. House Commons Debates, Apr. 22, 1970, 6170-6172.
35. Arctic Waters Pollution Prevention Act, supra note 34, at § 4.
36. Id. at §§ 8-12. See also U.S. Dep't State Release No. 121, Apr. 15, 1970.
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is imposed for any damage resulting from an unauthorized
discharge whether by vessel or from natural resource
developmentf A companion measure would establish a 12-mile
territorial sea s
The Canadian proposal was challenged by the United States
Department of State as constituting "unilateral extensions of
jurisdictions on the high seas [which] the United States can [not]
accept." Instead the United States proposed
international solutions . . . within the United Nations framework looking toward the conclusion of a new international
treaty dealing with the limit of the territorial sea, freedom of
transit through and over international straits, defining preferential fishing rights for coastal states on the high seas [and] for
controlling pollution on the high seas? 9
III.

PRESIDENT NIXON'S OCEAN PROPOSAL

The reason for the strong, perhaps overly strong, reaction on
the part of the United States became clear when on May 23, 1970,
President Nixon announced a proposed new United States oceans
policy which we will here examine in some detail in view of its very
significant potential effect on offshore resource development, and
coastal zone management and consequently environmental
protection. The Nixon proposal stated in part:
The issue arises now-and with urgency-because nations
have grown increasingly conscious of the wealth to be exploited
from the seabeds and throughout the waters above, and because
they are also becoming apprehensive about the ecological
hazards of unregulated use of the oceans and seabeads. The
stark fact is that the law of the sea is inadequate to meet the
needs of modern technology and the concerns of the
international community. If it is not modernized multilaterally,
unilateral action and international conflict are inevitable.
Therefore, I am today proposing that all nations adopt as
soon as possible a treaty under which they would renounce all
national claims over the natural resources of the seabed beyond
the point where the high seas reach a depth of 200 meters (218.8
37. Arctic Waters Pollution Prevention Act, supra note 34, at § 5.
38. Bill C-203, an Act to Amend the Territorial Sea and Fishing Zones Act.
39. U.S. Dep't State Release, supra note 36.
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yards), and would agree to regard these resources as the
common heritage of mankind.
The treaty should establish an internati6nal regime for the
exploitation of seabed resources beyond this limit. The regime
should provide for the collection of substantial mineral royalties
to be used for international community purposes, particularly
economic assistance to developing countries. It should also
establish general rules to prevent unreasonable interference with
other uses of the ocean, to protect the ocean from pollution, to
assure the integrity of the investment necessary for such
exploitation and to provide for peaceful and compulsory
settlement of disputes.
I propose two types of machinery for authorizing
exploitation of seabed resources beyond a depth of 200 meters.
First, I propose that coastal nations act as trustees for the
international community in an international trusteeship zone
consisting of the continental margins beyond a depth of 200
meters off their coasts. In return each coastal state would
receive a share of the international revenues from the zone in
which it acts as trustee and could impose additional taxes if
these were deemed desirable.
As a second step, agreed international machinery would
authorize and regulate exploration and use of seabed resources
beyond the continental margins.
The United States will introduce specific proposals at the
next meeting of the United Nations Seabeds Committee to
carry out these objectives.4
President Nixon also stated that the proposed treaty would provide
for a 12-mile limit for territorial seas and for free passage through
international straits. The urgency with which the proposal is
regarded by the Nixon Administration is evidenced by the fact that
on the following working day it was transmitted to the U.N.
Seabeds Committee by U.S. Ambassador Phillips with the
invitation to Committee members to discuss the same in
preparation for the August 1970 meeting of the Committee!'
The next proposal is essentially a liberalized version of that
proposed by the Marine Sciences Commission in its 1969 report
which would have confirmed unto coastal states exclusive
40. Weekly Comp. Presidential Doc., May 25, 1970, at 677-78.
41. Press Release USUN-70 (70), May 25, 1970.
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jurisdiction to a depth of 200 meters or 50 miles from coastlines,
whichever is further, and established an "intermediate zone"
beyond to the 2500 meter isobath or 100 miles from coastlines,
whichever is further.4 2 Within this zone coastal states would
administer the resource but proceeds from it would be paid to an
international fund to be used for the benefit of the poor and
undeveloped nations of the world.
In many respects the Nixon proposal is a clever one that couid
operate as the modus vivendi for achieving consensus on the
troublesome jurisdictional issues over which there has been so
much open disagreement the last few years between the developed
and developing countries of the world. This factor was vividly
illustrated by the fact that in December of 1969 the United Nations
General Assembly, following extensive and heated debates in the
Sea-Bed Committee and the U.N. First Committee, adopted a very
important resolution over the active opposition of the United States
and the Soviet Union and their usual supporting blocs. By a 65 to
12 vote with 30 abstentions, the General Assembly passed a
resolution requesting the Secretary General to determine
the desirability of convening at an early date a conference on the
law of the sea to review the regimes of the high seas, the
continental shelf, the territorial sea and contiguous zone, fishing
and conservation of the living resources of the high seas,
particularly in order' to arrive at a clear, precise and
internationally accepted definition of the area of the seabed and
ocean floor which lies beyond national jurisdiction, in the light
of the international regime to be established for that area.!3
By a vote of 62 to 28 with 28 abstentions, again with active
opposition of the Soviet Union, the United States and their blocs,
the General Assembly also passed a resolution providing that
nations "are bound to refrain from all activities of exploitation of
42. COMMISSION ON MARINE SCIENCE, ENGINEERING AND RESOURCES, OUR NATION
AND THE SEA 145-47 (1969).
43. A/RES/2574A (Sess. XXIV, Dec. 15, 1969). The original version of the resolution
was introduced by Malta and called for the Secretary-General to determine the views of
member states on the desirability of a conference "for the purpose of arriving at a clear,
precise and internationally acceptable definition" of the area beyond limits of national
jurisdiction (the "continental shelf") and the "prospective establishment of an equitable
international regime" for such area. U.N. Doc. A/C.L 473 (Oct. 31, 1969), Rev. 2, Dec. 2,
1969.
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the resources of the area of the seabed and ocean floor, and the
subsoil thereof, beyond the limits of national jurisdiction."4
The Nixon proposal is essentially an espousal of the 1967
proposal of Malta to the United Nations calling for the drafting of
a treaty which would reserve the seabed and ocean floor "beyond
limits of present national jurisdiction" as a "common heritage of
mankind" and provide for their "economic exploitation . . . with
the aim of safeguarding the interests of mankind [and using] the net
financial benefits derived [therefrom] to promote the development

of poor countries."

5

It accordingly can be expected to enjoy the

high degree of popularity accorded the Maltese proposal among the
smaller and lesser developed countries, 46 and by the same token

receive the whole-hearted criticism of the petroleum industry
which in effect viewed such proposal as a "U.N. sellout."4 7
It is, however, questionable whether the Nixon proposal
warrants the criticism of extractive industries viewed from an
44. A/RES/2574D (Sess. XXIV, Dec. 15, 1969). Resolutions of the U.N. General
Assembly do not have a formal binding effect upon member states. Articles 10 through 17
of the United Nations' Charter which sets forth powers of the General Assembly provides
merely that that body may "discuss," "consider" and "recommend." On the other hand,
resolutions of the Assembly can contribute substantially to the general body of customary
international law. See HIGGINS, THE DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW THROUGH
THE POLITICAL ORGANS OF THE UNITED STATES 5 (1963). With due regard to the interest that
the General Assembly and its Committees have taken in this area, formal action by it
could have considerable weight in establishing a rule of international law in this area.
As pointed out by U.S. Ambassador Christopher Phillips to the U.N. Seabeds Committee
on March 6, 1970, however, Resolution 2467D did not evidence consensus but "sharp controversy and substantial division." Press Release USUN-27(70) (Rev. 1) at 6.
45. U.N. Doc. A/6695, August 18, 1967.
46. It also found a substantial amount of support in the United States, notably in a
resolution proposed by Senator Pell that included its basic principles. S. Res. 172, 186, 90th
Cong. 1st Sess. (1967). See SEN. COMM. ON FOR. REL. REP., GOVERNING THE USE OF OCEAN
SPACE, 90th Cong. 1st Sess. 1-7 (1967). The proposal also found support in the Commission
to Study the Organization of Peace, the 1967 World Peace Through Law Conference, the
Center for the Study of Democratic Institutions and others. See HOUSE COMM. ON FOR.
AFF., SUBCOM.

ON INT'L ORGANIZATIONS AND MOVEMENTS, INTERIM REP., THE UNITED

H.R. REP. No. 999,90th Cong., 1st
Sess. (1967) 80-113; Eichelberger, A Case for the Administration of Marine Resources
Underlying the High Seas by the United Nations, 1967 ABA Nat'lI nst. on Marine Res., I
NAT. RES. LAWYER 85 (1968).
NATIONS AND THE ISSUE OF DEEP OCEAN RESOURCES,

47. See REPORT OF NATIONAL PETROLEUM COUNCIL, PETROLEUM RESOURCES UNDER
THE OCEAN FLOOR (1969); Joint Report of Sects. of Nat. Res. Law, Int'l and Comp. Law
and Standing Com. on Peace and Law Through U.N., app. ABA Aug. 7, 1968; cf Krueger,
The Convention on the Continental Shelf and the Need for Its Revision and Some
Comments Regarding the Regime for the Lands Beyond, 167 ABA Nat'l Inst. on Marine
Res., I NAT. RES. LAWYER 1, 16-17 (1968).
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operation standpoint. The proposal, if adopted by the world
community, would bring about a stabilization of titles in presently
uncertain situations, establish a means for acquiring concessions in
deep sea areas that are presently non-existent, maintain national
control over the exploitation of resources in the "continental
margins,"4 and invest national concessions in areas beyond 200
meters with an international trusteeship character which could
materially assist the present expropriation problem. Unless,
therefore, international participation in the proceeds of resource
exploitation is per se undesirable, it would seem attractive to the
extractive industries. Even here there is an interesting aspect to the
proposal. While it would divert to developing countries very large
revenues which the United States could expect to receive from
offshore areas that are proven or highly potential for petroleum
resources, this might well be compensated for by reducing direct
contributions for economic assistance to these countries which have
been quite large in the past.
Irrespective of the cleverness of the Nixon proposal from an
international standpoint and the relative efficiency of its scheme
from the mineral developers' standpoint, however, it could result in
the mismanagement of or impingement upon non-mineral
resources and uses. It should be emphasized that it is essentially
another measure directed toward the exploitation of the natural
resources of the seabed of the type which has predominated in the
world's thinking regarding the oceans in the past. Acknowledgment
is dutifully paid to "ecological hazards" and the need to establish
"general rules to prevent unreasonable interference with other uses
of the ocean [and] to protect the ocean from pollution." 4 9
Functionally, however, it could only serve to provide a further
incentive, indeed a catalyst, for the exploitation of extractive
resources of the seabed, particularly petroleum, both from the
standpoint of the operator and the developing countries for whose
benefit the exploitation will inure. In its present form the proposal
does not contain any functional brakes necessary to permit the
coastal state to slow or prohibit offshore development even on its
"continental margins," if it thinks it desirable to do so in order to
48. The proposal does not define this term, but the Department of State has informally
indicated that it would extend to the base of the continental rise. It would consequently
extend slightly further seaward than the "intermediate zone" discussed at note 42 supra.
49. See note 40 supra.
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enhance other uses and resources of the offshore and protect its
coastal zone.
The proposal would establish as international trust territory
lands lying between mainland California and certain of the Channel
Islands which lie more than 24 miles offshore (the sum of the two
proposed 12-mile territorial seas combined) and are separated by
waters more than 200 meters deep. The same situation would also
exist in similar areas off Alaska and perhaps in other areas of the
United States. It is questionable whether the United States as
trustee would be able to resist leasing the proven or highly potential
oil properties which lie in these areas particularly where requested
so to do withih the United Nations' structure. There recently has
been a great deal of pressure to bring about the cessation of all
offshore operations in the Santa Barbara Channel and severely
curtail them elsewhere in offshore California 0 Would not, however,
oil pollution in the Santa Barbara Channel be quite acceptable in
Madagascar, Tanzania and the Maldive Islands Sultanate if it
provided income for them? In fact, it is quite likely that pollution
from oil development in their own offshore would be very acceptable to these countries, bringing to them as it would greater
industrialization and economic growth. It is quite apparent in the
international (and even national) discussions on the subject that the
current concern over environmental quality is one relevant
principally to affluent countries and people that can afford what is
essentially a new luxury in an industrial society. Lesser developed
countries and people would like to first enjoy the benefits of
industrialization and technology before they begin to control its
deleterious aspects?1 They would also like their first chance to
pollute.
50. On October 29, 1969, Senator Cranston introduced S. 3093 which would suspend

all further federal leasing in offshore California provided that state law prohibits the issuance
of oil and gas leases in offshore areas adjacent to the outer continental shelf. On February 26,
1970, Senator Muskie introduced S. 3516 which would require the Secretary of the Interior
to assume operations with respect to all federal leases in the Santa Barbara Channel and
terminate permanently all such operations in an orderly and safe fashion. S. 3516 would
authorize actions against the United States to recover damages for the termination of such
operations. In addition a number of complementary measures have been introduced in the
California Legislature. Even if federal legislation on the subject is not adopted, it is highly
unlikely however that the Secretary of the Interior will hold any lease sales in Southern

California for some time to come.
51. See U.N. Press Releases on Preparatory Committee for United Natiops
Conference on Human Environment, HEI/Rev. 1, Mar. 6, 1970 to HE/16, Mar.20, 1970,
passim.
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This coastal zone management problem could be corrected in
large part by the United States asserting jurisdiction over such

areas as inland waters under either an "historic bay" or a "straight
baseline" concept where the international criteria for doing so are
met 2 Application of a straight baseline form of measurment would
clearly seem appropriate in the case of Alaska with its deeply
indented coastline and economic dependence on offshore fisheries

and other resources. Other situations for favorable application
exist in Maine, Massachusetts and Louisiana In all of these areas
and in California as well, strong cases exist for the claiming of
portions of these areas as historic bays.P
52. The Convention on the Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone, supra note 23, sets
forth the criteria for the straight baseline measurement in Article 4:
1.In localities where the coastline is deeply indented and cut into, or if
there is a fringe of islands along the coast in its immediate vicinity, the method
of straight baselines joining appropriate points may be employed in drawing the
baseline from which the breadth of the territorial sea is measured.
2. The drawing of such baselines must not depart to any appreciable extent
from the general direction of the coast, and the sea areas lying within the lines
must be sufficiently closely linked to the land domain to be subject to the regime
of internal waters.
4. Where the method of straight baselines is applicable under the
provisions of paragraph 1,account may be taken in determining particular
baselines, of economic interests peculiar to the region concerned, the reality and
the importance of which are clearly evidenced by a long usage ....
Article 7 of the Convention provides for a maximum 24-mile closing distance across bays
treated as inland waters, but provides in paragraph 6 that its provisions "shall not apply to
so-called 'historic' bays, or in any case where the straight baseline system provided for in
article 4 is applied."
As noted in United States v. Louisiana, 394 U.S. I1 (1969), the provisions of the
Convention embodied the principle of the Fisheries Case (United Kingdom v. Norway,
[1951] I.C.J. 11), in which it was held that Norway properly could draw its baseline for
measuring the territorial sea along the tips of thousands of rock ramparts which ring the
mainland yet which do not qualify as bays. Id. at 69. The Court held in United States v.
California, 381 U.S. 139, 168 (1965), that the choice to use the straight baseline form of
measurement is exclusively the federal government's. In the 1969 Louisiana decision,
however, it was made clear that the disclaimer of the federal government with respect to this
type of measurement would not be binding if inconsistent with its official international
stance. 394 U.S. at 73 n.97. A similar position was taken with respect to historic bays. Id. at
77.
Note that Canada has drawn straight baselines on both its east and west coasts in
comparable situations: Maps 401 (Nova Scotia), 402 (Newfoundland), 403 (Labrador), 391
(Vancouver Island) and 392 (Queen Charlotte Sound); Canadian Hydrographic Service,
Marine Science Branch, Dept. Energy, Mines and Resources, May 16, 1969 and Oct. 27,
1967.
53. In United States v. Louisiana, 394 U.S. 11, 72, the Court noted that "the straight
baseline method was designed for precisely such coasts as the Mississippi River Delta area."
54. See United States v. California, 381 U.S. 139 (1965); United States v. Louisiana,
394 U.S. 11,23, 72 (1969); JudicialRegime of Historic Waters, Including Historic Bays, 2
Y.B. INT'L L. CONM'N 1, 13, U.N. Doe. A/CN. 4/143 (1962).
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The United States is currently in litigation with all of these
states as to the location of their offshore boundaries, and this
appears to account for the reluctance of the federal government to
make international assertions of jurisdiction over these areas as
inland waters.5 5 Under the Submerged Lands Act of 1953 the
coastal states were given ownership of all lands lying three miles
seaward of the line of low tide or inland waters, which were
regarded as being a part of the state If the federal government
had made or were to make an assertion that an area were inland
waters it would, therefore, be a concession of this state's ownership
57
thereto and the area lying three miles beyond
It may be that this essentially proprietary concern was
sufficiently valid in the past to discourage the federal government
from making international claims for which it had proper grounds.
In light of the Nixon proposal it would no longer seem to be an
intelligent deterrent, however. The Nixon proposal is sufficiently
liberal in its concessions with respect to the continental shelf without a beneficence from the country's inland waters, particularly
one that could come in part from the pocket of the (U.S.) coastal
states.
The liberal posture toward settlement of international claims
and interests contained in the Nixon proposal may very well be in
the national interest, but it would seem incumbent upon the federal
government to take equally progressive steps toward the settlement
55. In 1958 the United States filed suit against Alaska to enjoin state leasing in the
Cook Inlet more than three miles from shore or from a 24-mile closing line drawn across the
Inlet. The State seeks to establish that the entire Inlet is within its jurisdiction as a historic
bay. There are many other potentially oil rich areas, such as Bristol Bay, in which similar
title disputes are foreseeable in Alaska.
The highly convoluted and unstable Louisiana offshore has been referred to a special
master to determine whether various water areas are inland waters on the basis of the
application of the principles set forth in the Convention on the Territorial Sea and
Contiguous Zone or on historic grounds. United States v. Louisiana, 394 U.S. 11 (1969).
On April 26, 1968, the State of Maine accepted for filing an "application to record the
staking out of a claim" accompanied by the required statutory fee. In response the United
States filed a complaint against the State of Maine and all other Atlantic Coast states in
which it stated, "[iun the exercise of the rights claimed by it, the State [of Maine] has purported to grant exclusive oil and gas exploration and exploitation rights in approximately
3.3 million acres of land submerged in the Atlantic Ocean in the area in controversy"
and thereby put in issue all federal-state boundaries on that coast. See Krueger, The Development and Administration of the Outer ContinentalShelf Lands of the United States,
PROCEEDINGS, 14TH ANN. ROCKY MT. MIN. L. INsT. 643,687-88 (1968). The issues presently
remaining in dispute with respect to California are insignificant.
56. 43 U.S.C. § 1301 etseq. (1964).
57. See United States v. California, 381 U.S. 139, 172-74 (1965), and note 52, supra.
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of the state-federal boundary disputes and in connection therewith
make such international assertions as appear appropriate, even if
the result would inure in part to the benefit of the coastal states.
The need of many of the (U.S.) coastal states for funds for
economic development is not irrelevant to this issue.
The issue here extends not merely to ownership of offshore
resources, but more importantly to jurisdiction over them. If (U.S.)
coastal states do not have jurisdiction over areas that are of
functional importance to them, they will be without the ability to
coordinate and give priorities among all uses and resources that
influence their coastal zone. There seems to be within the federal
government a strong and growing recognition that (U.S.) coastal
states are the proper repositories for coastal zone management
responsibilities 58 There would not, therefore, appear to be any
valid long-range reason to minimize the jurisdictional position of
the states in the offshore.
Similarly, the Nixon proposal in its present form does not give
adequate recognition to the interests of the national coastal state
over "other uses" of the seabed and ocean waters in the
international trusteeship territory for such as traditional real
property, recreational and military uses. It would clearly seem that
the nexus between the "continental margin" and the coastal nation
which justifies coastal management in the case of natural resources
58. The Marine Services Commission recommended the adoption of a coastal

management act to establish policy objectives and authorize grants in aid to coastal states to
plan and manage coastal waters and adjacent lands. OuR NATION AND THE SEA, supra note
42, at 57 et seq.
Bills have been introduced in Congress (S. 2802, S. 3460, S. 3183, H.R. 14730, and
H.R. 1473 1) to provide for grants to coastal states for designated state authorities to develop
long-range plans for their coastal zones. After approval of the plans by a federal agency, the
state authorities may also be given up to 50 percent of the cost of implementing their plans.
The coastal zone is described in the bills as being limited to the territorial sea or the seaward
boundaries of the states, which would probably not cover areas, such as the Santa Barbara
Channel, and which could prevent planning problems. See HOUSE COMM. ON MERCH.
MARINE AND FISHERIES, SUBCOM.

ON OCEANOGRAPHY,

HEARINGS, COASTAL ZONE

CONFERENCE, H.R. Rep. No. 91-14, 91st Cong., Ist Sess. (1969) at 195 et seq.
There is strong congressional and executive support for the coastal zone management
concept, and it is quite likely that federal legislation will untimately be successful. The bills
dealing with this concept call for the preparation of a comprehensive coastal zone plan by the
coastal state on a matching fund basis. If the plan is then approved by the federal
government as meeting federal policy objectives in the coastal zone, and the state is
determined to be institutionally organized to implement the plan, annual grants in aid to the
coastal state for the cost of implementing the plan are to be authorized. See Press Release,
Office of the Vice President, Oct. 19, 1969.
MANAGEMENT
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of the seabed would also justify management and jurisdiction in the
case of these other uses which could equally, perhaps more

significantly, affect the condition of the coastal zone?9 Already
there have been attempts to build islands on the Cortes Bank which

lies 120 miles off Southern California in an area over which the
United States asserted jurisdiction as outer continental shelf of this

country in 1967 under the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act

°

It

would be unfortunate if the authority of the federal government
were left to "implied" or "inherent" powers arising under its

sovereignty or the "freedom of the seas" as to which world opinion
might change as quickly as it may have done as to the extent of the

continental shelf. 1 In the future, particularly artificial islands and
other fixed living habitats are likely to be of great significance and

the coastal states' jurisdiction and control over them in the
proposed international trusteeship zone should be well established.
It is recognized that the Nixon proposal is of necessity of

preliminary and sparse nature at this point in time and that its
present purpose is clearly to serve as a vehicle for future discussions

which should develop detailed provisions on the many and complex
subjects with which it deals. It will be unfortunate, however, if
national and international discussions on the proposal fail to

develop provisions dealing with the foregoing problem areas. If
they do not it is questionable whether it will meet the obvious
interest of nations in offshore activities and pollution that affect
their coastal zones that is evidenced by the recent Canadian
legislation or the stated goals of saving "over two-thirds of the
59. Offshore islands and the other man-made coastal installations are proving to be
very much in demand, if not necessary, in urbanized coastal areas. There have been a vast
variety of such structures and installations proposed for continental shelf areas, including
airports, floating cities and hotels. See Urban Expansion Takes to the Water, FORTUNE,
Sept. 1969, at 131; NOSSAMAN OCS STUDY § 11.61. The fact that the Convention on the
Continental Shelf does not expressly provide for such uses does not necessarily mean that a
coastal state is without the power to make use of its continental shelf for such purposes,
although a negative inference in this regard can be drawn from the language of the
Convention. A valid case can be made that military installations are a permitted use by
reason of the coastal nation's inherent right of self-defense. See Franklin, The Law of the
Sea: Some Recent Developments with Particular Reference to the United Nations
Conference in 1958, 53 NAY. WAR COLL. BLUE BK. SER. 65-67 (1961); M. McDOUGAL AND

W. BURKE,

THE PUBLIC ORDER OF THE OCEANS

718-20 (1962). Note that non-mineral uses

are not authorized under the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act, 43 U.S.C. § 1331 et seq.
(1964).
60. 1 NOSSAMAN OCS STUDY 20.
61. See Franklin, and McDOUGAL AND BURKE, supra note 59.
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earth's surface from national conflict and rivalry [and protecting]
it from pollution.""2
IV.

QUALITY OF OFFSHORE OIL POLLUTION

Since the Santa Barbara Channel oil spill and several of the
other recent offshore oil accidents that have resulted in water
pollution, there have been suggestions that offshore oil development
itself is generically undesirable and should be severely curtailed and

even prohibited.

3

It is questionable whether offshore oil

development should be judged except in the context of a particular

area, under particular conditions and at a particular time. Any
assessment should determine the overall environmental and

resource potential of the area and judge any proposed use in light of
all relevant policy objectives. Decisions made on this basis could
vary. An oil and gas lease that might be appropriate for offshore

Louisiana might be inappropriate for the Santa Barbara Channel.
If offshore oil development is to be judged generically,
however, it should be considered in the context of other forms of

pollution and impingement upon the environment and in this light
it is one of the least significant. Compared to other forms of

pollution the oil spill resulting from offshore drilling is one of the
most observable and traceable, yet one of the least permanently

degrading to the environment. Despite the many scientific inquiries
that have taken place to date, no evidence of any permanent adverse

effect on living organisms in the Santa Barbara Channel has been
found,64 and law suits are pending which would effect proper
compensation to damaged property owners and others in the area if

liability is establishedY5 Compare in this regard the effect of the
discharge of hard pesticides into the ocean which result in
62. See note 40 supra.

63. See L.A. Times, Jan. 29, 1969, to May 1, 1970,passim.
64. See Neushal, FinalReport Dealingwith the Early Stages of the Santa BarbaraOil
Spill, FWPCA Con. No. 14-12-516, Santa Barbara, California (1969); Straughan and
Abbott, The Santa Barbara Oil Spill: Ecological Changes and Natural Oil Leaks,
University of California, Allan Hancock Foundation, Los Angeles, California (1969);
Glude, Observations on the Effects of the Santa BarbaraOil Spill on IntertidalSpecies 6
(Apr. 10, 1969). Cf. Hearingson S. 7 andS. 544 Before the Subcommittee on Air and Water
Pollution of the Senate Public Works Committee. 91st Cong., Ist Sess., ser. 2, pt. 3, at 848
(1969). See also Baldwin, A Case History of the Santa BarbaraOil Spill, PUBLIC LAND
LAW REVIEW COIMISSION, 17-23 (1969).

65. On February 20, 1969, the State of California, the county of Santa Barbara, the
City of Santa Barbara, and the City of Carpinteria, "on behalf of themselves and all other
public entities and agencies of the State of California similarly situated," filed a complaint
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irreversible damage to some wildlife by means and through sources

which are not readily observable or subject to being brought to
account6
With respect to liability for offshore oil spills, and particularly
the Santa Barbara disaster, reference is made to an excellent article
by Milton Katz of Harvard on "The Function of Tort Liability in

Technology Assessment" which appears in the current issue of the
University of CincinnatiLaw Review."

Mr. Katz concludes

generally that in activities such as offshore oil development there
has evolved a general doctrine of "enterprise liability" whether

based upon a theory of "strict products liability, on responsibility
for abnormally dangerous activities, on the doctrine of Rylands v.
Fletcher, or on nuisance."68 He also points out specifically with

respect to the Santa Barbara oil spill that there may be strict
liability because of a California case holding this rule to be

applicable to oil well drilling on the (grounds) that it is
extrahazardous

9

Lastly, Mr. Katz points out that liability may be

in the Superior Court of California for the County of Santa Barbara against the Union Oil
Company, Mobil Oil Corporation, Gulf Oil Company, Texaco, Inc., and Peter Bawden
Drilling, Inc. for injuries allegedly caused by oil drilling by the defendants off the coast of
Santa Barbara. State v. Union Oil Co., No. 84594 (Santa Barbara County Super. Ct., Feb.
20, 1969). In addition a large number of damage suits have been filed by private parties. A
rule of strict liability for oil well blowouts was established in California by Green v. General
Petroleum Corp., 205 Cal. 328, 270 P. 952 (1928). It is quite likely that a rule of strict
liability would apply to the Union Oil incident either on the basis of this case or for other
reasons. See Katz, The Functionof Tort Liability in Technology Assessment, 38 U. CIN. L.
REv. 587, 602, 645 et seq. (1969). In addition to the damage actions, there have been several
proceedings for injunctive relief. County of Santa Barbara v. Walter J. Hickel, No. 69-636AAH (U.S. Dist. Ct., C.D. Cal., Apr. 4, 1969): Complaint for mandatory injunction seeking
to enjoin the federal government and its oil lessees from engaging in further offshore drilling
operations. County of Santa Barbara v. Robert J. Malley, No. 69-1986-ALS (U.S. Dist.
Ct., C.D. Cal., Oct. 3, 1969): Complaint in the nature of mandamus, seeking to enjoin
Malley, the District Engineer of the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers for Southern California,
from granting further permits for offshore drilling structures and to require him to set aside
certain permits previously granted. Alvin Weingand v. Walter J. Hickel, No. 69-1317-EC
(U.S. Dist. Ct., C.D. Cal., July 10, 1969): Complaint for injunction (Outer Continental
Shelf Act) seeking to enjoin further drilling on the Union Oil Company A-21 lease as
recommended by the Dubridge committee.
66. See Kennedy and Hessel, The Biology of Pesticides,CRY CALIFORNIA 2 (Summer
1969); Open Letter to Governor Ronald Reagan and the People of the State of California
and the Summary on DDT, prepared and circulated by the Hopkins Marine Station of
Stanford University (June 4, 1969). It concerns "hard" pesticides and makes
recommendations for control and the ultimate ban of "hard" pesticides.
67. Katz, The Function of Tort Liability in Technology Assessment, 38 U. CIN. L.
REv. 587 (1969).
68. Id. at 607.
69. Green v. General Petroleum Corp., 205 Cal. 328,270 P. 952 (1928). See Katz, supra
note 67, at 645.
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sufficiently great in offshore oil spills so that offshore oil
development may be discouraged unless some sort of
governmentally assisted limitation is established. 0 The writer
concurs in all of these comments.
It has been suggested that petroleum development on the outer
continental shelf of this nation is not necessary if import quotas
were removed, particularly if other forms of price support to the
domestic industry, such as the depletion allowance, were removed
or lessened. From a standpoint of a strict economic analysis there is
support for this proposition, although much time could be spent
debating the merits and demerits from the standpoint of its effect
on our domestic petroleum industry and the need for reserves in this
country !' Without becoming embroiled in these issues, however, it
should be observed and emphasized that even if all of our petroleum
needs were to be met from foreign imports and domestic onshore
deposits (if there were unrestricted imports, there would be very few
onshore reserves that would be competitive), the oil would need to
be transported to this country by ships and other vessels which
appear comparably as prone, and perhaps more so, to accident and
oil spill as offshore production facilities and which in terms of
quantity create tremendously greater pollution. The Torrey
Canyon spillage illustrates this vividly. The wreckage of that ship
resulted in 30 million gallons of crude oil being released in the
English Channel. By way of comparison the Santa Barbara oil
spill, as estimated by the President's Panel, involved only 1 to 3
million gallons. 72 With due regard to the present state of
technology, therefore, offshore oil development would appear to
offer substantially less of a pollution threat than foreign crude
imports in large tankers.
It is foreseeable today that there will be seabed exploration
development techniques that will permit offshore fields to be
developed without any visible or material impingement upon other
uses and that pollution control techniques will be developed which
will greatly reduce the chances of spillage.7 3 These new devices and
70. Katz, supra note 67, at 650, 653-55,662.
71. See Mead, The System of Government Subsidies to the Oil Industry, 10 NAT. RES.
J. 112, 122 etseq. (1970).
72. The OilSpillProblem, 1st Rep. President's Panel on Oil Spills 4 (1969).
73. See Japaneseplansea-floor drillingrig-Governmentagency will spend $14 million
on five-year development program, 5 OCEAN INDUSTRY 23 (Mar. 1970); Mobil Tests SubSea Unit, 31 OFFSHORE 40 (Apr. 1970).
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techniques may be quite expensive, but if their use is made a

condition to bidding for offshore leases, it would be properly
reflected in the amount of the bids made and paid for by the federal

government as a means of minimizing use conflicts. Would it not
have been fairer to the federal government, to the oil lessees and to
the people of California if a portion of the $600 million bonuses

received for Santa Barbara leases had been allocated instead to
extraordinary safety measures and special installations to minimize

the possibility of spillage and infringement with other uses?
V.

NATIONAL REGULATION

This country has adopted the following broad policy objectives
regarding the use of its outer continental shelf

74

1. Efficient resource management-best effect the prudent

use of resources through their intelligent management by the
federal government! 5

2.

Encouragement of private participation-permit qualified

responsible representatives of the private sector to participate in the
development of outer continental shelf resources.7

3. The maximization

of revenue

to

the federal

government-effect the greatest direct financial return to the

resource owner

7

74. Taken in the composite they would appear to comprise the "maximum benefit for
the general public" objective of the Act creating the Public Land Law Review Commission.
43 U.S.C. § 1391 (1964). The objectives were identified during the course of the NOSSAMAN
OCS STUDY. See § 11.1.
75. The Truman Proclamation of 1945, the Marine Resources Engineering and
Development Act of 1966, and the legislative history of the Outer Continental Shelf Lands
Act of 1953 all evidence the objective of best effecting the prudent uses of resources through
their intelligent management by the federal government. Proclamation No. 2667, 3 C.F.R.
(1943-1948 Comp.) 67; 33 U.S.C. §§ 1101-24 (1966); 43 U.S.C. §§ 1331-43 (1953). See
NOSSAMAN OCS STUDY §§ 1.5, 1.12.
76. The Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act and the regulations promulgated pursuant
thereto clearly contemplate that the development of minerals in the outer continental shelf be
undertaken by qualified, responsible representatives of the private sector. 43
U.S.C. § 1337(a) (1953); 43 C.F.R. § 3380.1 (1964). The Marine Resources and
Engineering Development Act also recognizes the desirability of "[t]he encouragement of
private investment enterprise in exploration, technological development, marine commerce,
and economic utilization of the resources of the marine environment." 33 U.S.C. § 1101(b)
(3) (1966).
77. While there are indications in the legislative history of the Outer Continental Shelf
Lands Act that the generation of revenue was a secondary consideration, its subsequent
administration, particularly in recent years, clearly indicates that a basic policy objective has
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4. Encouragement of multiple use of resources-coordinate
management of the various resources and uses of the continental
shelf to minimize conflicts 78
5. The advancement of knowledge and the development of
technology-learn more about the offshore and its resources and
achieve the technological capability to safely permit the scientific
exploration and resource development.79
6. The protection of environmental quality-preserve and in
some cases restore the natural condition of the environment."0
A.

Outer ContinentalShelf Lands Act

The provisions of the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act" will
be briefly examined in light of these objectives, more particularly in
been to maximize revenue to the federal government from the sale of mineral leases. This was
particularly manifest in the 1968 Santa Barbara lease sale, from which the federal
government realized a profit of $600-million in bonus income at a time when it was sorely
needed by the Johnson Administration. See NOSSAMAN OCS STUDY § 4.16.
78. This objective has been repeatedly acknowledged as necessary by many branches of
the federal government. The Act for the classification of public lands which was passed
contemporaneously with the law creating the Public Land Law Review Commission defined
"multiple use" as follows:
[T]he management of the various surface and subsurface resources so that they
are utilized in the combination that will best meet the present and future needs of
the American people; the most judicious use of the land for some or all of these
resources or related services over areas large enough to provide sufficient
latitude for periodic adjustments in use to conform to changing needs and
conditions; the use of some land for less than all of the resources; and
harmonious and coordinated management of the various resources, each with
the other, without impairment of the productivity of the land, with consideration
being given to the relative values of the various resources, and not necessarily the
combination of uses that will give the greatest dollar return or the greatest unit
output.
43 U.S.C. § 1415(b) (1964).
79. This policy is implicit in the Truman Proclamation and the administration of the
Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act. It is made explicit by the Marine Resources and
Engineering Development Act and is also evidenced in the Convention on the Continental
Shelf. The Marine Resources and Engineering Development Act provides:
(b) The marine science activities of the United States should be conducted so
as to contribute to the following objectives:
(1) . .
(2) The expansion of human knowledge of the marine environment.
(3) The encouragement of private investment enterprise in exploration,
technological development. . ..
33 U.S.C. § 1101 (1966).
80. As discussed infra, this policy objective is evidenced in a number of recent federal
acts and in the administration of the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act. See also
NOSSAMAN OCS STUDY §§ 4.79-4.84.
81. 43 U.S.C. §§ 1331-43 (1964).
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light of the last, because pollution, of course, involves consideration
of environmental quality. The Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act
is the federal vehicle for the leasing of all offshore lands designated
"outer Continental Shelf" beyond the three-mile territorial sea "of
which the subsoil and seabed appertain to the United States and are

subject to its jurisdiction and control."8 It is clear that Congress in
passing the Act was aware that "continental shelf" as used in its

geologic sense extended only to lands lying interior of the geologic
slope 3 normally lying above a depth of 200 meters but the Act was

not restricted to those lands. It is clear, therefore, that the Act
applies to all lands properly claimed as continental shelf,
continental slope or otherwise.P For this reason the Act, itself, does

not constitute an assertion ofjurisdiction by the United States as to
any particular offshore area and is best viewed as a legislative

implementation of the 1945 Truman Proclamation. 5
The extent of the lands over which the United States has or
could assert jurisdiction to the offshore could be considerable and
go far beyond the geologic continental shelf or the 200 meters set
forth in the Nixon proposal!' The doctrine of continental shelf

which resulted from the Truman Proclamation arguably extends to
87
the base of the continental slope, or approximately 2,500 meters
Further, under the Convention on the Continental Shelf the coastal

state may claim "to a depth of 200 meters or, beyond that limit, to
where the depth of the superjacent waters admits of the exploitation

of the natural resources." 8 Commencing in 1961 the Department
of the Interior has issued leases under the Outer Continental Shelf

Lands Act covering areas 40 miles offshore and in waters as deep as
82. Id.
83. S. REP. No.411,83rd Cong., 1st Sess. 2,4-7,211-224 (1953); H.R. REP. No.413,
83rd Cong., 1st Sess. 2, 6-7 (1953). See Stone, United States Legislation Relating to the
Continental Shelf, 17 INT'L & CoMp. L.Q. 103, 112 (1968). Cf Christopher, The Outer
ContinentalShelfLandsAct; Key to a New Frontier,6 STAN. L. REV. 23,26 (1954).
84. See Memorandum Opinion from Assoc. Solicitor, Dep't Interior to Director BLM,
M36615/94127-61 (May 5, 1961); Barry, The Administration of the Outer Continental
ShelfLandsAct, 1967 ABA Nat'l Inst. Marine Res., I NAT. RES. LAWYER 38,46 (1968).
85. S. REP. No. 133,83rd Cong., Ist Sess. 2 (1953), stated that the Act was to give "the
weight of statutory law to the jurisdiction asserted by the proclamation of the President of
the United States in 1945."
86. See note 40 supra.
87. In the North Sea Continental Shelf Cases, [1969] I.C.J. 3, it is said at 22 that the
"continental shelf is, by definition, an area physically extending the territory of most coastal
states into a species of platform."
88. See note 13 supra, Art. 1.
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4,000 feet and 26 miles offshore and in waters from 1,200 to 1,800
feet in depth!' In addition the Secretaries of the Interior and the
Army asserted jurisdiction under the Act over an area
approximately 120 miles off Southern California which is
separated from the coastline by waters as deep as 6,000 feet! 0
Lastly, the Secretary of the Interior has issued exploratory permits

under the Act to conduct core drilling in the Gulf of Mexico in
waters as deep as 3,500 feet and on the Atlantic seaboard for waters
as deep as 5,000 feet and lying as far as 250 to 300 miles from the
coast." All of these acts are capable of being construed as an
assertion of jurisdiction by the United States over the areas in
question, notwithstanding the fact that exploration is not
necessarily equated with exploitation for purposes of the

Convention's definition! 2 The Nixon proposal, then, clearly is a
change of approach from the aggressive attitude with respect to

offshore claims that the United States and many of the countries of
3
the world have had in the past!
One aspect of the Act that is quite noticeable today is that it
contains no provisions indicating any real concern for or even
89. A 1961 lease of phosphate deposits lying approximately 40 miles seaward of
Southern California was approved by the Solicitor as being authorized under the Outer
Continental Shelf Lands Act on th6 grounds that it was applicable thereto "since the United
States [by its ratification of the Convention] has now asserted rights to the seabed and
subsoil as far seaward as exploitation is possible." Memorandum Opinion, supra note 84.
See also Krueger, supra note 47, at 6.
90. The Secretary of the Army, who was given authority under section 4(f) of the Outer
Continental Shelf Lands Act to "prevent obstruction to navigation [as to] artificial islands
and fixed structures located on the outer Continental Shelf," formally advised the proposed
island builders that their work could not be undertaken without the consent of the United
States. Such action was taken pursuant to a letter from the Solicitor of the Department of
the Interior to the Los Angeles, California, District Engineer, dated February 1, 1967, which
stated in part: "It is our opinion that the Cortes Bank area is within [the Convention on the
Continental Shelf] definition of 'continental shelf.'"
91. See Krueger, supra note 47, at 6-7. The Atlantic core-drilling was clearly considered
to be on the continental slope. Dep't Int. U.S.G.S. Release No. 94229-67 (May 26, 1967).
92. The permits involved appear to have been issued under section II of the Outer
Continental Shelf Lands Act which applies to "geological and geophysical explorations in
the outer Continental Shelf." There is no other statutory authority for the issuance of this
type of permit. With due regard to the fact that section 2(a) of the Act defines the "outer
Continental Shelf" as lands "subject to the [United States'] jurisdiction and control," there
is, therefore, good reason to conclude that the permits constitute an assertion ofjurisdiction
over the areas as continental shelf by the branch of the federal government that has been
entrusted with apposite administrative responsibility. See Memorandum Opinion and Barry,
supra note 84; cf Denmark v. Norway, [1933] I.C.J. 148, 192.
93. As of 1969, approximately 98 coastal nations had asserted general jurisdiction over
offshore minerals; of that number, at least 37 appear to have done so in areas which appear
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awareness of values or uses other than mineral ones and that it
provides no procedure for the weighing of and determination of

priorities among such values and uses. This is perhaps
understandable in light of the history of the Act. There is abundant

evidence that the primary, perhaps controlling, purpose of the Act
was to authorize and 'encourage the development of the vast

reserves and highly potential prospects of oil and gas on the outer
continental shelf. The Act itself states that the leasing power of the
Secretary of the Interior was authorized "[iun order to meet the

urgent need for further exploration and development of the oil and
gas deposits of the submerged lands of the outer Continental
Shelf."94

The absence of a procedure to determine and resolve conflicts
of multiple use on the outer continental shelf has, however, become

less understandable with the passage of time and the obvious
growth and importance of non-mineral uses and values. Today the

public reaction to the Santa Barbara oil spill and the growing
number of other incidents of offshore pollution would seem to

render continued legislative inaction impracticable 5 Even if
practicable, however, it is questionable whether it is excusable
today in light of the clear identification of problems in this area.

The State of California, in dealing with its offshore, has for many
years recognized that special conditions may be present in

particular areas which requires special leasing treatment

t

It has

further recognized that the public interest in offshore development

is sufficiently great to warrant mandatory public hearings prior to
the determination to lease and as a guide to the prescription of
special terms

7

to be in water deeper than 200 meters. See Ely, Jurisdiction Over Submarine Resources,
Statement before Subcommittee on Oceanography of House Committee on Merchant
Marine and Fisheries, Am. Bar Ass'n Release (Aug. 5, 1969), App. C (Survey of National
Practice).
94. 43 U.S.C. § 1337(a) (1964). Similar language was used with respect to sulphur
deposits. Id. at § 1337(c).
95. See L.A. Times, Jan. 29, 1969, to Apr. 1, 1970,passim.
96. The Cunningham-Shell Tidelands Act, CAL. STATS. 1955, C. 1724 (1955),
authorized the State Lands Commission, in offering tide and submerged lands for oil and gas
leasing, to prohibit "a particular method of exploration, development or operation" if such
method would result in "interfering with or impairing developed shoreline, recreational or
residential area... "' CAL. PuB. RES. CODE § 6874 (West 1956). The Commission was
also instructed to require slant drilling from upland sites in designated parts of the state. Id.
at § 6872. See also §§ 6873, amended 1969, 6818, 6871.2, and 6872.1, amended 1969.
97. The Cunningham-Shell Tidelands Act of 1955 required the Commission to publish
notice of any proposed offering of tide and submerged lands for oil and gas lease, in which
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The Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act permits the Secretary

of the Interior to prescribe regulations determined "to be necessary
and proper in order to provide for the prevention of waste and

conservation of the natural resources of the outer Continental
Shelf." s The regulations imposed have always called for approval
of the drilling plans for wells 9 and for operations to be conducted
in a way to minimize pollution. 101 The ill-fated Union A-21 well
which caused the Santa Barbara oil spill was, in fact, drilled under

a "deviation" from these regulations which caused or substantially
contributed to the problem encountered.10' Following the oil spill
the Secretary prescribed even more stringent conditions with
respect to drilling and operating practices"' and more significantly
required the Bureau of Land Management to determine the effect
of any proposed leasing upon the "total environment" and to
develop such special leasing conditions as are "necessary to protect

the environment and all other resources.'

0' t 3

In connection

case any "affected city or county" could require a public hearing to be held with respect
thereto. CAL. PuB. RES. CODE § 6873.2 (West 1956). That section further provides:
The Commission in determining whether the issuance of such lease or leases
would result in such impairment or interference with the developed riverbank or
shoreline, recreational or residential areas adjacent to the proposed leased
acreage or in determining such rules and regulations as shall be necessary in
connection therewith shall at said hearing receive evidence upon and consider
whether such proposed lease or leases would
(a) Be detrimental to the health, safety, comfort, convenience, or welfare of
persons residing in, owning real property or working in the neighborhood of
such areas;
(b) Interfere with the developed riverbank or shoreline, residential or
recreational areas to an extent that would render such areas unfit for
recreational or residential uses or unfit fer park purposes;
(c) Destroy, impair, or interfere with the esthetic and scenic value of such
recreational, residential or park areas;
(d) Create any fire hazard or hazards, or smoke, smog or dust nuisance, or
pollution of waters surrounding or adjoining said areas.
Following the Santa Barbara oil spill the section was amended so as to require a public
hearing on the matter in any case "within a city or county adjacent to such area [of proposed
offering]" and required the Commission at such hearing to "propose . . . a plan for the
control of subsidence and pollution which might occur as a result of the proposed oil and gas
operation." CAL. STATS. 1969, c. 1238. See Krueger,State Tidelands Leasing in California,
5 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 427,448 (1958).
98. 43 U.S.C. § 1334(a) (1) (1964).
99. 30 C.F.R. §§ 250.34-.35 (1954).
100. 30 C.F.R. §§ 250.30, 250.42 (1954).
101. See A Case History of the Santa BarbaraOil Spill, supra note 64, at 7.
102. 34 Fed. Reg. 13,544-48 (Aug. 22, 1969), amending 30 C.F.R. Pt. 250 (1954).
103. 34 Fed. Reg. 13,549 (Aug. 22, 1969), 43 C.F.R. § 3381A. See also id,
at § 3381.5.
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therewith the Director is permitted, but not required, to hold public
hearings and to "consult with State agencies, organizations,
industries, and individuals."'10 When the new regulations were
under consideration the petroleum industry was given the
opportunity to comment upon them and did so. Its representatives
uniformly opposed the concept of public hearings as being an
invitation to delay. Many also objected to the section dealing with
the evaluation of the proposed leasing upon the environment'"
This is a classic illustration of the gross insensitivity of the
petroleum industry to the social temper and attitudes of our
times-an insensitivity which has substantially contributed to, if
not in some instances caused, today's precarious offshore political
situation. The industry has traditionally had a close-mouthed,
independent and private attitude towards operations. A company
makes its deal, drills its wells where it thinks it should and sells
what it gets. The public is not involved except as a shareholder. In
fee-leasing situations and in early offshore leasing this philosophy
presented no problems, certainly in dealing with the Department of
the Interior, and many of the state leasing agencies whose
employees had industry training or associations.
Today, however, even if the petroleum industry is still
philosophically the same, few others are. As the public outcry in the
Santa Barbara situation indicates, there are today many in this
country, possibly even a majority, who feel that they have a
legitimate interest in and "rights" with respect to the activities of
industry, irrespective of how proper and conventional they may be
from a contractual and legal standpoint." 6 Further, and perhaps
even more significantly, this philosophy, and the protests made as a
part thereof, have found much support in the news media and a
ready acceptance on the part of many influential people in
government.
Even prior to the Santa Barbara catastrophe, it is doubtful
that there were "safe" offshore areas in the country where oil
104. 34 Fed. Reg. 13,549 (Aug. 22, 1969), 43 C.F.R. § 3381.4.
105. Cf.Oil Industry Opposes Hearingson Leasesfor Offshore Drilling. N.Y. Times,
Aug. 3, 1969; Watching Washington-OffshoreRules Could Be Costly in Wrong Ways, 67
OIL& GAS J., July 7, 1969.
106. It is noted in the New York Times article, supra note 105, that one individual
wrote to the Department of the Interior asking that public hearings be mandatory. She
stated: "How can an individual voice his opinion when hearings may be avoided? . . .It
would be denying man his rights."
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development could be undertaken relatively without concern
regarding the public's interest in other resources and values. Since
this event, however, it is unlikely that the federal government or any
of the coastal states would consider offshore leasing without
considering what the effect of probable developments and possible
accidents might have on the total environment. Moreover, each
leasing agency must consider what steps can be taken to avoid
confrontations with the public and resultant political ramifications.
From this standpoint of neutralizing opposition and avoiding
political criticism the evaluation study and public hearing
procedure is extremely desirable, if not a necessity. 07
Even when one keeps in mind the oilman's traditional
mystique, it is difficult in the extreme to understand why the petroleum industry did not perceive the desirability of this procedure
and use the opportunity to endorse it to gain good will. By the same
token, it is difficult in the extreme to perceive why the petroleum
industry opposed the stricter operating conditions and antipollution measures of the new federal regulations when many of the
leading companies already followed the stricter standards as a
matter of internal policy and it was obvious that there had to be
some administrative recognition of the problem evidenced by the
Santa Barbara oil spill.los The petroleum industry has shown only

rudimentary recognition of the fact that the public needs to be
prepared for and is perhaps more interested in developments off our
coasts, than what brand of gas to buy."°9
Notwithstanding the massive influence which the Santa
Barbara disaster had on state and federal offshore leasing and the
repeated assertions made by opponents of offshore development
that domestic production from our offshore is not needed, the
industry has not yet presented its case to the public. It seems clear
107. See

2D REP.

PRESIDENT'S

PANEL ON OIL SPILLS, OFFSHORE

MINERAL

RESOURCES-A CHALLENGE AND AN OPPORTUNITY (1969).

108. In FORTUNE, Feb. 1970, at 114, 174, oil company officials are quoted as saying:
The great California oil spill has tarnished the industry's reputation and is all

the more exasperating to many oil executives because in their opinion it was
foreseeable and preventable. They point out that thousands of wells have been

sunk off the California and Gulf coasts without mishap. Union Oil, it is felt,
stretched the rules of the game by not sinking a well casing deep enough in a

notably unstable geologic area; and the fact that it had permission to do so from
the federal government doesn't mend matters.
Cf N.Y. Times, Mar. 13, 1970 (Hickel Calls OilSpill in the Gulf a "Disaster").
109. There is a growing but still insufficient interest by industry in this area. See API
UnwrapsBroad New Public-AffairsProgram, 68 OIL & GAS J. 35, Apr. 3, 1970.

REGULATION OF POLLUTION

19701

that the petroleum industry must convince the public and
government that it needs to operate in this country's offshore and
that it has the capability to avoid undesirable impingements upon

other values and uses, if it is to continue to operate there and obtain
necessary leases on a scale comparable to that of the past.
B.

National Oil Pollution Legislation

There has been a substantial amount of recent federal

legislation relevant to offshore oil pollution. The most recent and
comprehensive national measure dealing with oil spillage, including

pollution from offshore oil production, is the Water Quality
Improvement Act of 1970.110 The Act repeals the prior basic
offshore oil spill legislation,"' the Oil Pollution Act of 1924.11 In
its place, the new Act imposes certain obligations on owners and
operators of fixed facilities, without question including oil wells,113

whether offshore or onshore, upon their discharging oil into the
United States' navigable waters or contiguous zone, as defined in

the 1958 Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous
Zone. 1 4 Such owners and operators must not notify federal
authorities of the discharge,115 be subject to a civil penalty of up to
$10,000 for each knowing discharge," and reimburse the United
States for costs of removing the oil from the waters and shoreline,

unless the discharge was caused solely by acts of God, war or third
parties, or by federal government negligence.11 7 Similar obligations

are imposed upon owners and operators of private vessels 1
110. Pub. L. No. 91-224, Title I (Apr. 3, 1970), 84 Stat. 91.
111. Id.atll3 § 108.
112. 33 U.S.C. §§ 431-37 (1964); see also 19 C.F.R. § 23.32 (1968). The Oil
Pollution Act of 1924, before its repeal, prohibited the discharge of oil by any method from
any ship within the United States' three-mile territorial waters, except in cases of
"emergency" or "unavoidable" accident. However, the 1924 Act did not apply to pollution
from fixed offshore drilling operations. In addition, in 1966, Congress limited its application
to grossly negligent or willful discharges. See Oil Pollution of the Sea, 10 HARV. INT'L L.J.
316, 338 et seq. (1969).
113. See HOUSE REP. (PUBLIC WKS. COMM.) No. 91-127, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1969),
U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 809,840 (1970).
114. Convention, supra note 23, at Art. 24.
115. 84 Stat. 92 § 102, amending Federal Water Pollution Control Act, 70 Stat. 498,
33 U.S.C. § 466 et seq. (1964) [hereinafter referred to as FWPCA], to add § l1(b)(4).
A similar duty is imposed as to discharge of other hazardous polluting substances. 84
Stat. 98 § 102, adding FWPCA § 12(c).
116. 84 Stat. 92 § 102, adding FWPCA § 1l(b)(5).
117. Id.at94-95 § 102, adding FWPCA §§ 11(0(2)-(3).
118. Id. at92,94 § 102, adding FWPCA §§ 11(b)(4)-(5), 11(f)(1).

SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 7

The cost of removal for which they are liable is limited to $8
million in the case of oil discharge from a fixed facility, and $14
million or $100 per gross registered ton, whichever is less, in the
case of discharge from a vessel; however, liability is unlimited in
both cases if willful misconduct or willful negligence is involved." 9
A state or its political subdivisions may impose further liabilities
with respect to oil discharges into state waters within the three-mile
territorial sea.120 Existing liabilities for property damage to public
or private parties from discharges of2 oil or other hazardous
pollutants remain unaffected by the Act. '
Under the new Act, an applicant for a federal permit to
conduct any activity which may result in discharges into the United
States' navigable waters, such as offshore oil and gas drilling, must
provide certification from a state, interstate or federal water
pollution control agency, of reasonable assurance that applicable
water quality standards will not be violated by the applicant's
activity. 2 Public notice of all applications for such certification is
required and public hearings may be held thereon in the certifying
agency's discretion. 2 Existing permits for activities lawfully
commenced prior to the Act's enactment require no certification,
but will terminate three years after the Act's enactment if such
2
certification is not providedY.1
The new Act also appropriates $35 million for a revolving fund
to carry out removal by the United States of oil or other hazardous
pollutants from waters and shorelines.'2 The Act specifies further
that the President is to prepare a National Contingency Plan for
removing discharged oil, 26 and issue regulations defining harmful
discharges' z and providing for removal of discharged pollutants
and prevention of discharges.' s Federal contracts and grants are
authorized for research into water quality control,'29 and the Act
calls for a federal study of the financial responsibility and liability
limitations of ownefs and operators of facilities and vessels.3 0
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.

Id. at 94-95, adding FWPCA

§ I1(0.

Id. at97 § 102, adding FWPCA § I (o)(2).
Id. at97,99 § 102, adding FWPCA §§ 11(o)(1), 12(e).
Id. at 108 § 103, amending FWPCA § 21(b)(1).
Id.
Id. at 109 § 103, amending FWPCA § 21(b)(7).
Id. at 96, 99 § 102, adding FWPCA §§ 1(k), 12(h).
Id. at93 § 102, adding FWPCA § 11 (c)(2).
Id. at92,98 § 102, adding FWPCA §§ l1(b)(3), 12(a).
Id. at 96,98 § 102, adding FWPCA §§ 1 1(j)(1), 12(a).
Id. at 104-07 § 102, adding FWPCA §§ 16-19.
Id. at98 § 102, adding FWPCA §§ lI (p)(4 ).
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In addition the Nixon Administration has asked for
ratification of the 1969 amendments to the 1954 International
Convention for the Prevention of Pollution of the Sea by Oil. 131 and
for two new international conventions signed by the United States
last year in Brussels.132 The Amendment to the 1954 Convention
deleted the provisions of that convention establishing specified
prohibited discharge zones. In its place, a provision was adopted
prohibiting all discharge from tankers except where the tanker is
more than 50 miles from the nearest land provided the rate of
discharge of oil content does not exceed 60 liters per mile and the
total quantity of oil discharged on a voyage does not exceed
1/15,000 of the total cargo carrying capacity of the ship. The new
Conventions would authorize the United States to take preventive
action against vessels on the high seas which threatened imminent
pollution danger to our coasts and would impose strict civil
liability, with certain minor exceptions, upon the owner of vessels
responsible for pollution damage regardless of the location of the
vessel; subject, however, to a limitation of such liability with
respect to any one incident to approximately $125 per gross ton or
$14,000,000, whichever is less. There would be no such limitation,
however, when the pollution was due to the fault of the owner. The
Administration has also instructed the Secretary of State to seek
international agreement for the prescription of standards for the
construction and operation of tankers. 33 There -is consequently
evidence of the Administration's position that it will seek
multilateral solutions to the problems dealt with unilaterally by
Canada in establishing its Arctic Waters Pollution Control Zone. 4
Perhaps incipiently the greatest new development in federal
Policy
regulation was the adoption of the National Environmental
136
Act of 1969.'3 The Act provides in pertinent part:
The Congress authorizes and directs that, to the fullest
extent possible: (1) the policies, regulations, and public laws of
131. Amendment adopted by the Assembly of the Inter-Governmental Maritime
Consultative Organization in London, Oct. 21, 1969. I.M.C.O. Doc. A VI/Res. 175, Jan.
16, 1970. Amendments will come into force 12 months after ratified by two-thirds of the
governments which are parties to the Convention.
132. International Convention Relating to the Intervention on the High Seas in Cases

of Oil Pollution Casualties, and International Convention on Civil Liability for Oil
Pollution Damage, done at Brussels, Nov. 29, 1969, 9 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 25,45 (Jan.
1970).
133. Nixon Launches Plan to ControlSpills, 68 OIL&
134. See note 34 et seq., supra.

135. Pub. L. No. 91-190, 83 Stat. 852.
136. Id. § 102.

GAS

J. 58, May 25, 1970.
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the United States shall be interpreted and administered in
accordance with the policies137 set forth in this Act, and (2) all
agencies of the Federal Government shall(A) utilize a systematic, interdisciplinary approach which
will insured the integrated use of the natural and social sciences
and the environmental design arts in planning and in decisionmaking which may have an impact on man's environment.
(B) identify and develop methods and procedures, in
consultation with the Council on Environmental Quality
established by title II of this Act, which will insure that
presently unquantified environmental amenities and values may
be given appropriate consideration in decision-making along
with economic and technical considerations;
(C) include in every recommendation or report on
proposals for legislation and other major Federal actions
significantly affecting the quality of the human environment, a
detailed statement by the responsible official on(i) the environmental impact of the proposed action,
(ii) any adverse environmental effects which cannot be
avoided should the proposal be implemented,
(iii) alternatives to the proposed action,
(iv) the relationship between local short-term uses of
man's environment and the maintenance and enhancement of
long-term producitivity, and
(v) any irreversible and irretrievable commitments of
resources which would be involved in the proposed action should
it be implemented.
It is difficult to predict what impact the Council will have in its
advisory capacity on the broader issues involved with due regard to
its massive review responsibilities as to 102 statements.'3
137. Section 2 defines the purpose of the Act as follows:

To declare a national policy which will encourage productive and enjoyable
harmony between man and his environment; to promote efforts which will
prevent or eliminate damage to the environment and biosphere and stimulate the

health and welfare of man; to enrich the understanding of the ecological systems
and natural resources important to the Nation; and to establish a Council on
Environmental Quality.
138. Id. at § 204. See N.Y. Times, May 27, 1970 (EnvironmentalAgency Has Too
Much Work to Do Crusading).
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CONCLUSION

The development of offshore oil in this country is presently
necessary. It is also necessary that other uses and values be
protected and it is doubtful that government or industry has put
sufficient emphasis on this objective in the past. The present context
is a viable one in which to effect sensible changes in our legal
system. As unfortunate as it has been in many respects, the Union
oil spill focused national and international attention on the
problem of protecting the sometimes delicate ecological balances of
the marine environment from the effects of mineral development. It
very possibly served as a turning point for changing the thinking in
many parts of the country from "how can we use it?" to "how can
we protect it?" From the long range standpoint this may prove to
be a gain for all of us. Hopefully the interest and proposals which
have arisen out of this event will ultimately move us toward a more
intelligent use of the world's coasts and oceans and their quite
exhaustible resources.

